Land Trusts in New York by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 37 
Number 1 Volume 37, December 1962, Number 
1 
Article 4 
May 2013 
Land Trusts in New York 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1962) "Land Trusts in New York," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 37 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss1/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES
LAND TRuSTS IN NEW YORK
New York, at present, does not recognize the legal mechanism
known as a land trust. This trust concept has, however, been
sanctioned by Illinois case law for many years.' More recently
Florida has attempted to reap its benefits.2 Its growing national
recognition is evidenced by an enactment earlier this year of
Virginia's General Assembly whereby use of the land trust device
was expressly authorized.3 In view of its increasing popularity,
the possibility of employing this type of trust in New York or
of adopting legislation expressly enabling its existence, becomes
significant to lawyers, bankers and real estate investors. 4
A land trust is a trust of real estate wherein the settlor
grants the realty to a trustee to have and to hold in fee simple.
The trustee has full record title and under the terms of the deed
in trust is entitled to all the rights, privileges and powers of record
ownership. The deed in trust specifically states that a potential
purchaser, lessee, mortgagee, or pledgee shall not be obliged to
1 Gordon v. Gordon, 6 111. 2d 572, 129 N.E.2d 706 (1955); Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d
992 (1939); Kerr v. Kotz, 218 Ill. App. 654 (1920) (abst. dec.), aff'd, 299
Ill. 465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921).
2 McKillop II, The Illinois Land Trust In Florida, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 173
(1960).
3 VA. CoDE ANx. § 55-17.1 (Supp. 1962). Virginia by enactment of this
statute became the first state enabling land trusts by legislation. The statute
became effective June 29, 1962.
4 See Schwind, Land Trusts: A Real Estate Syndication Device, 101
TRUSTS & EStaTES 650, 652 (1962).
5 The following is a clause from a standard Illinois deed in trust enumerat-
ing the precise powers, rights and privileges of this trustee:
"Full power and authority is hereby granted. to the Trustee and its suc-
cessors to protect and conserve the Property; to sell, contract to sell and grant
options to purchase the Property and any right, title or interest therein on
any terms; to exchange the Property or any part thereof for any other real
or personal property upon any terms; to convey the Property by deed or other
conveyance to any grantee, with or without consideration; to mortgage, pledge
or otherwise encumber the Property or any part thereof; to lease, renew,
extend, amend and otherwise modify leases on the Property; and to release,
convey or assign any other right, title or interest whatsoever in the Property
or any part thereof."
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inquire into the authority of the trustee's acts.6 This deed in trust
is subject to a second document known as a land trust agree-
ment which enumerates the beneficiary's rights in relation to the
trustee. It is important to remember, for purposes of market-
ability of title, that only the deed in trust is recorded. 7 The un-
recorded trust agreement lists the beneficiary's rights with respect
to the property which are: 1) the power to direct the trustee
to convey or otherwise deal with the title to the property, 2) the
right to manage and control the property and 3) the right to
receive the proceeds and avails from the rental, sale, mortgage or
other disposition of the property.8 The important distinguishing
factor between a land trust and the so-called real estate investment
trust (more commonly referred to as a business or Massachusetts
trust) is that in the latter, the trustee actually manages the business
by making the decisions and investing accordingly.9 In a land
trust the duties of the trustee are severely restricted by the land
trust agreement to acts affecting the title to the property and those
acts can only be performed at the direction of the beneficiaries.
The basic structure of a land trust having been delineated.
the next concern is: what are the potential advantages of its use?
The most significant benefits are: 1) those flowing from the
conversion of realty into personalty, 2) those resulting from full
record title being in the trustee and 3) the possibility that an
investment group may avoid corporate taxation by the establishment
of such a trust.10 An explanation of these benefits will be helpful
before the legal roadblocks which exist under present New York
law will be considered.
Equitable Conversion and Record Title in Trustee
The first potential advantage results from the legal significance
of converting realty into personalty. This transformation is a
6 The purchaser is protected under the typical Illinois deed in trust by the
following clause:
"No party dealing with the Trustee in relation to the Property in any
manner whatsoever, and no party to whom the Property or any part thereof
or any interest therein shall be conveyed, contracted to be sold, leased or
mortgaged by the Trustee, shall be obliged (a) to see to the application of
any purchase money, rent or money borrowed or otherwise advanced on the
Property, (b) to see that the terms of this trust have been complied with,
(c) to inquire into the authority, necessity or expedience of any act of the
Trustee, or (d) be privileged to inquire into any of the terms of the Trust
Agreement."
7See Garrett, Land Trusts, U. ILL. L.F. 655 (1955) ; Schwind, supra note
4, at 650.
8 Garrett, supra note 7, at 662 (1955) ; Comment, 8 Da PAUL L. Rv.
385 (1959).
9 Schwind, supra note 4, at 652.10 Id. at 650.
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consequence of the doctrine of equitable conversion." Since under
the trust agreement, the beneficiaries have directed that the trustee
must sell the real estate within a period of time, 12 such a mandatory
direction to sell causes an immediate conversion.' Under this
concept of equitable conversion, the beneficiary's interest is deemed
personalty.14 One benefit of this conversion is the preservation of
the entity of jointly-owned real estate since partition will not
lie with respect to the property held in trust because it is regarded
as personalty. 15 A second practical advantage of this equitable
principle is that a personal judgment against a beneficiary cannot
operate as a lien against the trust real estate nor can it act as a
cloud on the title because of the personal nature of the beneficiary's
interest.16 A third useful application of this trust form lies in the
fact that the settlor may make any disposition of the beneficial
interest which he might have made in the usual inter vivos trust,
yet still maintain complete control over the trust res.1 7  Retention
of such control by the settlor of the usual trust arrangement would
render that trust executed.' 8  There are also those benefits
which result from record title being in the trustee. The first
advantage of such an arrangement is that the complexity involved
in the conveyancing of jointly-owned property may be eliminated
completely by having the trustee alone execute the deed.19 Under
such a disposition, the problems of transferring multiply-owned
realty resultant from out-of-state owners, the death, bankruptcy
or incompetency of one of the owners or a judgment being obtained
against one of them are all avoided. 20 A second benefit of full
record title residing in the trustee is the preservation of the
anonymity of ownership.21 There are instances when the negotia-
tions for the purchase of land can better be handled if the true
11 BoGERT, TRUSTS § 37, at 163 (3d ed. 1952).
12 This "within a stated period of time" prerequisite is essential in order
that the Rule Against Perpetuities of the particular state will not be violated.
13 Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926).
14 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 131, at 975-77. "The direction to sell the land causes
what is called an 'equitable conversion' of the real estate into personalty ....
The cases are numerous in which it is held that a mandatory direction to
trustees to sell land which they hold in trust causes an equitable conversion
.... There is an equitable conversion where the trustee is directed to sell the
land, even though it is not his duty to sell it immediately." Ibid.
15 Aronson v. Olsen, 348 Ill. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932). See Breen v. Breen,
411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
16 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill.
App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939); Turner, Some Legal Aspects of Beneficial
Interests Under Illinois Land Trusts, 39 ILL L. REv. 216, 219 (1945).
17 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 8, at 661.
18 See BoaGRT, TatrSTS § 46, at 201 (3d ed. 1952).
'9 Garrett, Land Trusts, U. ILL. L.F. 655, 660 (1955).2o Ibid.
21 Garrett, Legal Aspects of Land Trusts, 35 CHI. B. REc. 445, 454 (1954).
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purchaser remains unknown.2 2  The owner of a building may
wish to avoid personal complaints from tenants or a landowner
may simply, for any number of reasons, desire that his wealth
be a secret hidden from his associates. These are but some of
the practical considerations involved in veiling true ownership.
Real Estate Syndication With No Corporate Taxation?
In addition to the benefits accruing from the equitable con-
version theory and those resulting from full record title vesting
in a trustee, the land trust may be effectively used as a real estate
syndication device.2 3  An important advantage of this mechanism
over the corporate form is the possibility that an investment group
may avoid taxation at the corporate rate.2 4  Whereas the Internal
Revenue Service taxes the corporate income 25 and also the dividend
of the shareholder,28 the trust income is not subject to such double
taxation. Under the trust form, the trustee may deduct from the
trust income the amount distributed to the beneficiaries. 27 Since
in the land trust the beneficiaries receive all the income, there
can be no tax on the trust itself because the trust realizes no
economic gain. One of the areas in which this potential tax ad-
vantage can be realized is real estate syndication: the purchasing
of large, expensive tracts of land and selling low-priced shares
in them to the investing public. The prime factor spurring
Florida's innovation of the land trust is the hope of developing its
thousands of acres of virgin land.28  Such syndication need not
be restricted to the development of untouched lands but can be
advantageously used for the development of slum areas, 29 a type
of urban renewal which can be afforded by private investors
due to the multitude of low-cost fractional interests. Since the
beneficiary's interest is assignable and transferrable,3 0 the investor
may be more willing to speculate.
A difficult question to answer is whether such an investment
syndicate could successfully avoid corporate taxation. Since the
federal tax code has included the concept of "association" within
22 Ibid.
23 See McKillop II, The Illinois Land Trust In Florida, 13 U. FLA. L.
REv. 173 (1960).
24 Schwind, Land Trusts: A Real Estate Syndication Device, 101 TRUSrS &
ESTATEs 650, 651-52 (1962) ; See Taubman, The Land Trust Taxable as Asso-
ciation, 8 TAx L. Rxv. 103 (1952).
25 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
26 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 63(a).
27 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 661.
28 McKillop II, supra note 23, at 173.
29 Garrett, supra note 21, at 453.
30 Comment, 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 385 (1959).
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the term "corporation" for revenue purposes, 31 the ultimate ques-
tion determinative of corporate taxability is whether a land trust
possesses sufficient corporate attributes to qualify as an association.32
The Supreme Court found no difficulty in determining in Hecht
v. Malley 3 3 that a business trust is included in the word "asso-
ciation."3 4  In 1935, the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Com-
missioner 35 explicitly enumerated the criteria for distinguishing
between an entity taxable as a corporation and a nontaxable trust
by concluding that the five salient features of a corporation for
tax purposes are: title to property held by an entity, centralized
management, continuity uninterrupted by death, transfer of interest
without affecting the continuity of the enterprise and limited lia-
bility.3 6 It is safe to state that the taxable status of a land trust
is somewhat equivocal 37 and indeed it would seem that the very
flexibility of the land trust agreement makes difficult the establish-
ment of an objective standard as to its classification. As a practical
matter, such classification is an ad hoc judgment determined by
the facts of each individual land trust agreement. However, we
are guided by the Treasury Regulations which, in effect, minimize
the tax risk involved by setting forth six characteristics as a guide-
line in resolving the question of whether a group should be treated
as an "association" for tax purposes. The six indicia are: 1) the
presence of associates, 2) an objective to carry on a business and
divide the gains therefrom, 3) continuity of life, 4) centralization
of management, 5) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate
property and 6) free transferability of interests.38 Furthermore,
the Regulations state that an "unincorporated organization shall
not be classified as an association unless such organization has
more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics." 39
It is clear then that the absence of a single corporate characteristic
will not prevent the land trust from being taxed as a corporation
if there are sufficient corporate attributes to bring it within the
test of the Regulations.40  As was said in one case which dealt
31 INT. REv. CoDn OF 1954, § 7701 (a) (3) "Corporation. - The term 'cor-
poration' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."
32 See Lassers, Land Trusts, Federal Income Taxes and Contentious Bene-
ficiaries - A Tale With A Moral, 40 CI. B. REc. 127, 129-30 (1958); See
Taubman, mpra note 24.
33265 U.S. 144 (1924).
34 Id. at 161.
35296 U.S. 344 (1935).
36 Id. at 359.
37 Taubman, The Land Trust Taxable as Association, 8 TAX L. Rav. 103,
115 (1952). "The judicial borderline has remained indistinct and shadowy,
an invitation to litigation and confusion." Ibid.38 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
39 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960) (emphasis added).
40 7 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATIoN 38A.10 (Cumin. Supp.
1962).
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with this precise problem prior to the promulgation of the 1960
regulations:
[W]here the entity or enterprise in question which it is sought to tax
as an association under the corporation statute, resembles a corporation in
some respects and a pure trust in others, the features of similarity should
be compared and the marks of dissimilarity contrasted and the two balanced,
and from this the true taxable entity determined. 41
The risk borne by such an attempted evasion of the burdensome
corporate tax is quite evident. An unfavorable decision in the
Tax Court might destroy one's venture, especially in light of
the possibility of a twenty-five percent penalty for failure to file
a corporate return.42  It would seem then that the taxation ad-
vantages of the land trust may depend in large measure upon
the legal draftsmanship and skill exercised in preparing the land
trust agreement. 48
Feasibility in New York
Could an attorney at the present time attempt to utilize the
land trust mechanism in New York? The answer to this query
hinges on an analysis of New York law regarding certain property
and trust concepts which are intrinsically interwoven into the land
trust device. Among these must be discussed the present status
of New York law concerning the nature of the beneficiary's interest
in the trust res, the Rule Against Perpetuities, the Statute of
Uses, the marketability of title and the problems raised by Section
96 of the New York Real Property Law.
1. Beneficiary's Interest is Personalty
Section 100 of the New York Real Property Law states
that in an express trust, the legal estate shall vest in the trustee
and the beneficiary retains no legal estate or interest but only
a chose in action.44  It is fundamental that a chose in action
is deemed personalty. 45 This being so, it would seem that in
New York there is a statutory establishment of the beneficiary's
interest as personalty. Thus, New York avoids the problem
4' Commissioner v. Gibbs-Preyer Trusts Nos. 1 & 2, 117 F.2d 619, 623
(6th Cir. 1941).
42Taubman, supra note 37, at 115. "[T]he very creation of a land trust
is perilous. The corporate tax may be unexpected and its impact disastrous."43 Id. at 113.
44 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 100; Bacorn v. People, 195 Misc. 917, 88 N.Y.S.
2d 628 (Ct. CI. 1949); See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 37, at 160 & n.89 (3d ed.
1952).
45 Castle v. Castle, 267 Fed. 521, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1920).
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encountered in those states which consider the beneficiary as having
a right in rem in the trust res and who, consequently, must
utilize the doctrine of equitable conversion to transform this right
in rem into personalty.4"
2. Rule Against Perpetuities
Another problem which must be explored is whether such a
trust in New York would violate Section 42 of the Real Property
Law which is the New York statute against perpetuities. The
historical objective of this rule which limits the time during which
a res may be held in trust is the preservation of the alienability
of property.47 Until quite recently, the time limit in New York
was a period "of not more than two lives." 48 But in 1958, the
New York Legislature amended this harsh restriction to extend
the limit for a period not to exceed the "continuance of lives
in being at the creation of the estate and a term of not
more than twenty-one years."' 49 This more liberal rule would
seem to minimize any problem for the settlor in. a land trust since
he could designate the lives of a reasonable number of persons
and add twenty-one years which should be a sufficient time for
the land trust to accomplish the objective for which it may have
been created. It is interesting to note that New York's recent
legislation permitting the use of a real estate investment trust 0
skirted the potential problem of violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities by amending section 42 to expressly exclude a real
estate investment trust from the prohibition of this rule.51 This
legislation indicates New York's favorable attitude toward the
development of real estate, 2 a use for which a land trust may be
employed. Assuming that New York is desirous of introducing
land trusts and that the present Rule Against Perpetuities would
restrict the full usefulness of such trusts, the above legislation
illustrates the ease with which the land trust could be exempted
from the rule.
46 See BOGER, TRUSTS § 37 (3d ed. 1952).
47 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 292-93 (N.Y. 1835).48 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42.
49 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42, as amended 1958.
80 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 96(7) (1961).
51 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42-d (1961). This section in reference to real
estate investment trusts declares that they "shall not be deemed to be invalid
as violating any existing laws against perpetuities or suspension of the power
of alienation . . . ." Ibid.
52 1961 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2100, Governor's Messages to the Legislature,
Real Property 96(7): "These measures are of considerable importance to the
business climate of the State in that without the authority they provide funds
now available for investment in such enterprises in New York may well flow
to qualified trusts created under the more liberal provisions of law in some
of our sister states. It is appropriate and desirable that this opportunity be
made available in New York."
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3. Statute of Uses
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to be hurdled in New York
is compliance with the New York interpretation of what con-
stitutes an active trust. The New York statutes dealing with
active and passive trusts are Sections 92 and 93 of the Real
Property Law. They provide that the title of a trustee may not
be merely nominal but such title must be connected with some
power of actual disposition or management in relation to the realty
which is the subject of the trust.5 3 If no such duties are entailed,
the trust res is deemed "dry" or "passive," full title passes directly
to the intended beneficiary and the trustee takes nothing.5 4  Illinois
has bypassed this problem by expressly holding that a land trust
is not executed by the Statute of Uses.' 5 The reasoning employed
is that if active duties are imposed, it matters not that they are
merely formal or ministerial.56 Virginia has employed statutory
enactment to avoid the possibility of an executed trust by de-
claring that "no trust relating to real estate shall fail . . .
because no duties are imposed upon the trustee." 57 Florida is
presently experiencing difficulty with its courts' interpretation of
the Florida Statute of Uses. It is attempting to resolve the
problem by conferring upon the trustee certain administrative duties,
such as preparing fiduciary reports and submitting a terminal
accounting, in an attempt to take the land trust without the Florida
interpretation of the statute.5 8  Whether Florida's imposition of
such ministerial functions on the trustee will constitute the trust
active has not yet been determined by litigation in its courts.
Whether the land trust will be deemed executed in New
York depends on how strictly our courts apply sections 92 and
93. It is well settled that a disposition to one person for the use
of another with the trustee having no active duties is a "dry"
trust.59 It has been held that if the sole duty of the trustee is
to hold the bequest for a specified period and distribute it in
accordance with the provisions of a will, this is not a sufficient
55 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 92.
54 IA BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §206 (1951).
55 Breen v. Breen. 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); Crow v. Crow, 348
Ill. 241, 180 N.E. 877 (1932).
56 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Il.
App. 329, 338, 20 N.E.2d 992, 996 (1939). The court declared: "If active
duties are imposed it does not matter that they are merely formal or
ministerial."
57 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Supp. 1962).
5s McKillop II, The Illinois Land Trust In Florida. 13 U. FLA. REv. 173,
176 (1960).
59 In the Matter of Lang, 23 Misc. 2d 328, 197 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Surr. Ct.
1960) ; In the Matter of Kuehnle, 4 Misc. 2d 540, 158 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Surr.
Ct. 1956).
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obligation to make the trust active.60 It appears then that in
New York, contrary to the majority rule, a direction to the trustee
to convey or distribute is not sufficient to create an active trust.61
But if the trustee is authorized to collect the rents and profits of
the real estate 62 or is authorized to accumulate the income from
the realty,6 3 these duties are sufficient to declare the trust active.
However, there seems to be no objective standard which the New
York courts apply to distinguish between the active and passive
trust. Some courts have indicated the existence of what might
be termed a "discretionary rule" whereby if a trustee has some
discretion to exercise in relation to his control over the trust res,
this discretion would constitute the trust active.64  It would seem
then that under New York's strict interpretation of its Statute
of Uses, the duties imposed upon the trustee in a standard land
trust which would consist of holding record title and exercising
the rights, privileges and powers incident thereto, not as a matter
of discretion, but only at the direction of the beneficiary would
fall short of the active duties required as defined by the New
York courts. If New York desires to circumvent this problem
it has an option of abolishing its Statute of Uses as has been
done in Virginia, of becoming more liberal in its interpretation as
has been done in Illinois or of imposing sufficient active duties
upon the trustee as has been attempted in Florida.
4. Marketability of Title
Under the land trust arrangement, the trust agreement is not
recorded. As has been heretofore pointed out, the recorded deed
in trust relieves the purchaser from any responsibilities regarding
the trustee's authority to act. Illinois has had no problem in
upholding the marketability of title of the trust realty. In Virginia,
the recently enacted statute assures marketability 65 and the title
insurance companies are issuing policies on land trust titles. Florida
has encountered a problem as illustrated by Resnick v. Goldmnan 66
wherein the purchaser was permitted to regard the title as un-
60I re Donohue's Estate, 143 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Surr. Ct. 1955); In the
Matter of Estate of Spruce, 188 Misc. 776, 67 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Surr. Ct.
1947).
61 In re Schaefer's Estate, 121 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
62 In the Matter of Fischer, 307 N.Y. 149, 120 N.E.2d 688 (1954); see
Monypeny v. Monypeny, 202 N.Y. 90, 95 N.E. 1 (1911).
63 In the Matter of Estate of Corin, 22 Misc. 2d 699, 200 N.Y.S.2d
770 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In the Matter of Bolton, 195 Misc. 224, 90 N.Y.S.2d
295 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (dictum).64 Verdin v. Slocum, 71 N.Y. 345 (1877); see In the Matter of Bolton,
supra note 63; BoGEr, TRUSTS § 46, at 201 (3d ed. 1952).65 VA. CoD ANN. § 55-17.1 (Supp. 1962).
66 133 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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marketable and was consequently excused from performance. The
basis for the court's decision was that there existed the possibility
that the unrecorded trust agreement could conflict with the terms
of the deed in trust and hence there was a potential cloud on the
title.67  Attorneys in Florida have avoided the effect of that case
by altering the form of deed in trust to eliminate all reference
to an unrecorded trust agreement. The general rule is that when
the trustee holds the trust res for the purpose of sale and con-
version into money or with a power of sale and conversion, a good
faith purchaser for adequate consideration will acquire a valid title.68
The important factor regarding protection of the purchaser is
whether the trustee has the power of sale which he, of course,
does in a land trust mechanism. New York is one of a number
of states which has a statute expressly relieving the purchaser
from the necessity of seeing to the application of the purchase
price by the trustee.6 9  Since the New York statute"7 expressly
protects the bona fide purchaser for value, it would seem that
under the land trust device in New York, there would be no
problem concerning the marketability of the trust realty.
5. Real Property Law § 96
A further legal obstacle is presented by Section 96 of the Real
Property Law which lists eight purposes for which express trusts
may be created.71 These eight classifications pre-empt the establish-
ment of other express trusts. It is apparent that a land trust could
not be classified within the first seven categories. The eighth
category, which is a recent amendment, is "to effect and carry
out any purpose for which a contract may lawfully be made." 72
This amendment became effective in September of 1962 and there
is as yet no indication of its interpretation.7" If it be liberally
interpreted, perhaps it will permit the establishment of a land
trust but it is too soon to conjecture. If the land trust cannot be
included within this recent amendment, express legislation will be
necessary.
67 Id. at 771.
683 REDFiELD, LAW OF WiLLs 620 (3d ed.).
69 4 BoGERT, TRuSTS & TRusTEEs § 901 n.4 (1948).
70 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 108.
71 N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 96.
72 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 96(8) (Supp. 1962).
73 1962 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), N.Y. LAW REVISION Comm'N REP. states
that "the New York statute defining purposes for which trusts of real property
may be created should be broadened to include any purpose for which a con-
tract may lawfully be made."
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Conclusion
There seems to be no doubt that the land trust can be a
valuable legal device in New York. The flexibility of its or-
ganization and the number of purposes for which it can be used
render it particularly useful to the creative attorney. Since the
beneficiary's interest is deemed personalty, partition will not lie
and a judgment against the beneficiary will not act as a lien on the
realty. Record title being in the trustee, the sale of jointly-owned
realty is greatly facilitated and the anonymity of the beneficiaries
may be preserved.
From the taxation standpoint, there is the consideration that
a skilled lawyer can so establish the land trust that it will have
fewer corporate than noncorporate characteristics and thus, burden-
some corporate taxation may be bypassed. The relative freedom
of organization when contrasted to the rigid compliance with
statutory norms demanded of corporations seems to be another
advantage over the corporate form.
The most serious legal roadblock to introduction of the land
trust in New York is the consideration that the duties imposed
on the trustee would seem to be insufficient to qualify it as an
active trust and, consequently,' the trust would be deemed
executed. It appears that statutory exemption from sections 92
and 93 is the most practicable solution to the problem of "dry"
trusts. Section 96 of the Real Property Law, as already indicated,
may also require legislative amendment although there is a pos-
sibility that the courts may be able to bring the land trust under
subdivision eight of that section.
In any event, the practical utility of the land trust as a legal
tool is beyond question. It would appear to be merely a matter
of time before its legal feasibility under New York law will be
put to the test.
M
FUNCTIONAL DIscouNTs- A THREAT TO COMPETITION?
The Robinson-Patman Act was established to insure com-
petitive equality by strengthening antitrust laws and by protecting
the businessman against unfair trade practices and unlawful price
discrimination.' To accomplish this result, section 2(a) of the
1 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). For a general
survey of the origin and legal impact of the Robinson-Patman Act, see
AusTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
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